Monday, September 28, 2026

How Interest Rate Changes Affect Bank Profitability and Capital

Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book (IRRBB) refers to the potential impact that changes in market interest rates can have on a bank's earnings and its overall capital. This risk arises from the core business of banking: taking in deposits and lending money out, often over different timeframes and at different types of rates (fixed vs floating).

We can break down the main effects into three key areas:

1. The Funding Side: The Cost of Deposits

A bank's primary source of funding is customer deposits. The risk here is that the cost of these deposits can change unexpectedly. When market interest rates rise, banks may need to increase the interest they pay to depositors to prevent customers from moving their money to higher-yielding investments. If the bank has to raise its deposit rate quickly, its cost of funding goes up, which squeezes the profit margin it earns from lending. Conversely, when rates fall, if the bank cannot lower its deposit rates proportionally (perhaps because they are already near zero), its profit margin is also compressed.

2. The Asset Side: The value of Loans and Mortgages

This is the risk associated with the money the bank has already lent out, especially long-term, fixed-rate loans like mortgages. Consider this example: If a bank has issued a 30-year mortgage at a fixed rate of 3%, and market rates then rise to 5%, the bank is stuck earning a below-market rate for years. The economic value of that 3% loan decreases because it's less profitable than a new loan issued today. We refer to this economic relationship as 'duration' risk.

If market rates fall significantly, homeowners with those 3% mortgages will likely refinance to get a new, lower rate. They pay back their loans to the bank early. The bank now has its cash back, but must lend it out again at the new, lower market rate, earning less income than it had originally planned. This is known as Prepayment Risk.

3. The Impact on Capital: The Investment Portfolio

This is a direct and significant impact on the bank’s balance sheet and net worth, separate from its day-to-day earnings. Banks hold large portfolios of high quality securities (like government treasuries) as a way to store liquidity. When interest rates rise, the market value of existing, lower-yielding bonds falls. There is a negative relationship between market interest rates and the price of fixed-income securities. This “paper loss” doesn’t immediately hit the bank’s income statement. Instead, it is recorded in a special section of shareholder’s equity called Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI). A negative entry in AOCI directly reduces the bank’s total equity, thereby lowering its book value and shrinking its capital base.  

Putting the Pieces Together

Let me give you a brief example. Take a look at the interest income and interest expense behavior based on data available in the St. Louis FED FRED Tool.

It is clear that around 2Q2022 to about 3Q2024 interest expense increased faster than interest income, leading to a compression in bank’s net interest income. This particular time was when we had higher market interest rates. 

Conclusion:

Interest rate risk can materially affect a bank's earnings, liquidity profile, and capital position. Depending on the structure of its assets and liabilities, rising interest rates may initially benefit or hurt net interest income. However, as funding costs adjust and securities portfolios experience valuation pressure, many banks face net interest income margin compression and reductions in economic capital. While banks actively hedge these exposures, hedging involves costs and may not fully offset the effects of large interest rate movements.

Saturday, September 26, 2026

The Art of Plausible Deniability in Market Commentary

I recently read an opinion piece in the Financial Times arguing that 5% is the "magic number" for the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield and that yields are unlikely to move sustainably higher. The writer is Karen Ward, who is the chief market strategist for Europe, Middle East and Africa at JPMorgan Asset Management.

Karen framed the discussion around three arguments for higher yields:

1. AI-driven productivity gains have raised the neutral rate of interest.

2. Investors should demand a larger premium because of deteriorating U.S. fiscal policy.

3. Bonds have lost their diversification benefits.

What struck me was that the author treated these three arguments very differently.

For the first argument, she discussed why AI productivity gains would need to be exceptionally large to justify materially higher yields and pointed to signs that higher rates are already affecting the economy. However, she never clearly stated, "I am skeptical of this view." The reader is left to infer her position.

The second argument was similar. She acknowledged that U.S. fiscal policy likely deserves some additional risk premium, but then emphasized the Federal Reserve's credibility in controlling inflation. Again, she never directly stated whether she believed fiscal concerns were large enough to drive yields materially higher. Here again, we are left to wonder what her stance is.

The third argument was different. There, the author explicitly stated, "This is wrong." She rejected the idea that bonds have permanently lost their diversification value, arguing that if the AI boom weakens and growth slows, Treasuries could still provide significant portfolio protection through falling yields and Fed rate cuts. To me, there is nothing particularly revelatory about her observation because that is largely what has transpired in recent years, although I would argue that this view rests on shakier foundations than many investors assume.  

Let’s go back to her points. Note the asymmetry in treatment for each one. Given that the author is a chief strategist at a large asset manager, this may not be accidental. Institutional market commentary often leaves room for multiple outcomes. Strongly rejecting an argument can be costly if events later prove otherwise.

The important takeaway of Karen's view is that it's broadly representative of the prevailing Wall Street narrative that yields are approaching a ceiling and are unlikely to move sustainably higher. However, it largely dismisses the fact that Treasury yields have been on a sustained upward trajectory since 2020. In April 2020, the 10-year Treasury yield was roughly 0.61%, and by September 24, 2026, it had risen to 5.18%. I do not yet see evidence that the forces driving higher yields have gone away.

Conclusion:

Beware when reading market views of institutional players because incentives may be misaligned. That does not mean that the analysis is wrong, but incentives are a big deal to determine credibility. When a strategist at a major institution publishes an opinion piece, from their perspective there is often value (incentives) in leaving room for multiple outcomes.

As an independent observer, my incentives are gaining wisdom, knowledge, and understanding and conveying what I see to the broader public. Unlike institutional strategists, I am not tasked with representing a large asset-management business.

There is nothing magical about 5%, or 4.99%, or 6%. People (or the markets) give meaning to those numbers. What matters is the trend. As I've pointed out previously, the upward trend in yields remains firmly entrenched. Given the amount of liquidity and fiscal spending in the system, I believe it will become increasingly difficult for the FOMC to prevent bond vigilantes from demanding higher yields.

Thursday, September 24, 2026

Record Emerging Market Debt Issuance: Opportunity or Warning Sign?

Emerging markets have issued a record amount of foreign-currency debt this year despite higher global interest rates and a stronger U.S. dollar. Is this a sign of confidence, or are investors overlooking risks that have repeatedly surfaced throughout history?

My latest note explores some drivers behind the issuance boom and the lessons from past emerging market debt crises:

https://uncommoninsight384054130.wordpress.com/2026/09/24/not-all-is-well-a-tale-of-emerging-market-debt/

Surging government bond yields raise alarm

The era of ultra-low interest rates is over, but global debt continues to grow. With G7 bond yields at their highest levels since 2008 and debt-servicing costs climbing, policymakers and investors are increasingly worried about sustainability. 

Read my brief note on one of the most important macroeconomic challenges facing the world today:

https://uncommoninsight384054130.wordpress.com/2026/09/24/surging-government-bond-yields-raise-alarm/


Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Late‑Cycle Financial Engineering: Are CFOs and NAV Loans the Canary in the Coal Mine?

The Financial Times just highlighted the surge in CFOs and NAV loans, two complex instruments that echo the financial engineering we saw before 2008. These markets have grown several‑fold since 2021, despite being opaque and difficult to price. To me, they signal that we’re deep into the late stages of this financial cycle.

I break down the data, the risks, and the historical parallels on my WordPress blog here:

https://uncommoninsight384054130.wordpress.com/2026/09/23/late-cycle-financial-engineering-are-cfos-and-nav-loans-the-canary-in-the-coal-mine/ 

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

Inflation 101 – What is it?

Inflation is not “prices going up.” That is the symptom. The cause is far simpler: when money supply outruns the real economy, everything else follows. The data from 2016–2026 makes this impossible to ignore.

Go to my WordPress site to read the full post here:

https://uncommoninsight384054130.wordpress.com/2026/09/22/inflation-101-what-is-it/

Saturday, September 19, 2026

Economic Risk Dashboard: A Framework to View the US Economy

This post introduces a practical dashboard for assessing the health of the US economy amid an age of deep uncertainty. By monitoring foundational indicators across household strength, credit markets, and consumer confidence, the framework offers a structured way to interpret where we may be in the economic cycle. Yet the analysis also acknowledges a critical truth: numerical metrics, while useful, are judgmental representations of reality. They cannot replace wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, which require a deeper philosophical view of how economic life actually works.

Go to my WordPress site to read the full post here: