Monday, November 16, 2026

US Treasury Basis Trade: The $1.2 Trillion Market and Why It Matters

The Treasury cash-futures basis trade is an arbitrage strategy used primarily by multi-strategy hedge funds to exploit small pricing discrepancies between cash Treasury bonds and Treasury futures contracts. According to estimates, hedge funds hold about 7% of US Treasury debt and engage in leveraged basis trades totaling about $1.2 trillion. With such material exposures, there are risks that few truly appreciate. Here I explain the nature of the basis trade, why the market has grown, and the potential risks that the market brings.

What is the Treasury Basis Trade?

  • The Basis: The “basis” is the price difference between a physical cash Treasury security (i.e., the actual US Treasury security) and its corresponding Treasury futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
  • The Core Dynamic: In theory, due to the no-arbitrage principle, the price of a Treasury future should precisely equal the cash price of the underlying Treasury bond plus the net cost of holding that bond until the contract’s deliver date (i.e., the “cost of carry”). However, in practice, there is a market imbalance.
  • The Market Imbalance: Asset managers (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies) often prefer to obtain US Treasury bond exposure via futures contracts because futures require less upfront capital and allow for more cost-efficient portfolio duration adjustments. This persistent institutional demand motivated by the preference I just mentioned bids the price of futures up slightly above their theoretical fair value relative to cash Treasuries.

Step-by-Step Mechanics of the Trade

To capture this small pricing discrepancy, a hedge fund acts as an arbitrageur through a four-step process:

Step 1: Identify the Spread – The hedge fund identifies that a Treasury futures contract is trading at an implied premium relative to the deliverable cash Treasury bond (e.g., a spread of 20 to 40 basis points annualized).

Step 2: Establish the Market Position:

  • Buy (Long) the undervalued physical cash Treasury security.
  • Sell (Short) the overvalued Treasury Futures contract.
  • Outcome: The position is economically hedged against broad interest rate movements. If interest rates rise or fall across the economy, the gain on one leg offsets the loss on the other.

Step 3: Apply Massive Leverage via the Repo Market – Because a 20 – 40 basis point return is too small for a hedge fund, the fund magnifies the return by borrowing using the bilateral repo market as follows:

  • The hedge fund posts the newly purchased cash Treasury bond as collateral to a Broker / Dealer (aka ‘Prime Broker’, or PB).
  • The PB lends cash to the hedge fund with a very low or zero haircut (often 0% to 2%) due to the low risk associated with the US Treasury bond collateral.
  • The hedge fund uses this borrowed cash to purchase more Treasuries, repeating the cycle.
  • Leverage Scale: with a 2% haircut, the trade is leveraged approximately 50-to-1 (50x = 1/0.02). A modest 30 basis point spread is transformed into a 15%+ return on equity (= [50 x 0.003] x 100).

Step 4: Daily Rollover – The Treasury bond position is held for weeks or months until the futures contracts approach expiration (when cash and futures prices must mechanically converge). However, because the repo financing is typically overnight or short-term, the hedge fund must roll over its repo borrowing every single business day.

Why Has the Basis Trade Grown Massively?

Significant U.S. Debt Issuance: The U.S. Treasury has issued historic amounts of debt to finance approximately $1.8 trillion of annual fiscal deficits. Primary dealers cannot hold this entire inventory on their balance sheets without selling it or finding non-bank buyers.

Asset Manager Futures Demand: Traditional asset managers benchmarked to bond indices buy Treasury futures to match their index duration without having to deploy full cash to purchase bonds. For example, instead of purchasing $100 million of U.S. Treasury bonds outright, an asset manager may obtain equivalent Treasury exposure through a futures contract by posting, say, $3 million of initial margin. This allows the manager to deploy the remaining $97 million into other investments during the life of the futures contract. If the position is held through delivery, the investor ultimately receives an eligible Treasury security from the delivery basket (typically the cheapest-to-deliver security).   

Hedge Funds as Market Absorbers: Because traditional investors like pension funds prefer to buy derivatives (futures) rather than tie up all their cash in purchasing physical bonds, hedge funds step in as a middleman. They buy physical bonds from government auctions, store (“warehouse”) them using short-term borrowed money, and sell the futures to the pension funds. Note that all the buying and selling of futures happen at the CME. Without these hedge funds, the government would struggle to find enough buyers for its massive debt issuance at current interest rates.

Potential Systemic Risks and Fragilities

While the basis trade provides useful market liquidity during normal times, its scale and structure introduce severe systemic vulnerabilities:

Risk 1: The “Maturity Mismatch” & Repo Financing Shocks

  • The Fragility: The hedge fund holds long-dated assets (e.g., 5-year, 10-year, or 30-year Treasuries) financed with ultra-short overnight liabilities (daily repo).
  • The Threat: If overnight repo rates spike (as they did during the 2019 repo spike), the cost of borrowing overnight can wipe out the entire profit margin of the trade in a single morning. If PBs withdraw repo lines, hedge funds can no longer fund their cash Treasuries, requiring them to sell their bonds to raise cash.

Risk 2: Margin Spiral and the “March 2020” Precedent

The biggest system threat is a sudden, correlated unwind (a fire-sale cycle). This is not hypothetical, as it caused the catastrophic Treasury market seizure in March 2020 that had these characteristics and sequence of events:

Market Volatility Spikes à CME Hikes Futures Margin Requirements à Hedge Funds Face Immediate Multi-billion Dollars Cash Margin Calls à Funds Force-Sell Cash Treasuries to Meet Margin Calls à Cash Treasury Prices Plummet / Spreads Widen (i.e., Blowing Out the Basis & Triggering More Selling) à Federal Reserve Emergency Intervention

What Happened in March 2020: As COVID panic hit, Treasury futures margins jumped, and cash Treasury spreads diverged wildly. Highly leveraged basis trade funds faced massive margin calls. To raise cash, they dumped hundreds of billions of physical Treasuries into an illiquid market, causing the U.S. Treasury market to virtually stop functioning until the Fed intervened with a $1.6 trillion in emergency repo and unlimited QE purchases.

Risk 3: Dealer Intermediation and Non-Bank Blind Spots

  • No Direct Fed Access: Hedge funds cannot borrow from the Fed’s Standing Repo Facility (SRF) or the Discount Window. They depend entirely on primary dealer banks as intermediaries.
  • Regulatory Capacity Limits: Under the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), PBs must hold capital against their gross repo exposures to hedge funds. If market volatility spikes, dealers may cut off repo financing to basis trade funds to protect their own regulatory capital ratios, triggering forced fund liquidations.

Risk 4: Clearing and Opacity Risks (Bilateral Shadow Markets)

A significant portion of basis trade repo financing occurs in the bilateral, uncleared repo markets, where trade terms, leverage levels, and haircuts are privately negotiated without centralized trade repository reporting. Regulators have repeatedly warned that they have limited real-time visibility into the exact concentration of leverage across top hedge funds.

Conclusion

There is an enduring financial adage that there is no such thing as a free lunch. This principle is particularly apt when evaluating the multi-layered architecture of the Treasury basis trade.

What appears to be on the surface a low-risk, market-neutral spread capture is, in reality, a fragile ecosystem. It thrives precisely because of regulatory frictions that make balance sheets expensive, complex interdependencies across multiple counterparties, and an extraordinary reliance on daily leverage. In such an interconnected structure, systemic risks rarely announce themselves, as they lurk in the opaque corners of uncleared bilateral funding markets and maturity mismatches. 

In response to these risks, regulators have initiated several major structural reforms:

  • Mandatory Central Clearing for Treasuries: The SEC has adopted rules requiring most cash Treasuries and repo transactions to be centrally cleared through the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC).
  • Enhanced Form PF Disclosures: The SEC and CFTC have expanded reporting mandates for large hedge funds to provide detailed visibility into bilateral repo borrowing, gross leverage, and counterparty exposures.
  • Standing Repo Facility (SRF) Backstop: While hedge funds cannot tap the SRF directly, PBs can use the SRF to finance Treasury collateral, indirectly supporting their ability to maintain repo lines to clients during market turbulence.

While these policy responses represent meaningful progress toward containing known structural vulnerabilities, an important institutional caveat remains: these mechanisms have yet to be truly pressure-tested by a severe, systemic market crisis.

A limitation of the regulatory reforms is that they are engineered around the disruptions observed previously (e.g., September 2019 repo spike and March 2020 market freeze). In a live crisis, correlations break, liquidity evaporates non-linearly, and unexpected behavioral bottlenecks emerge. Historical precedent suggests that theoretical backstops often face unforeseen operational or structural frictions when stress reaches a peak. Until these reforms weather a full-scale liquidity shock, the true resilience of the modern basis trade architecture remains an open question.  

Friday, November 13, 2026

The End of Cheap Money and the Risks Ahead

The Financial Times (FT) recently published an article examining how the end of the ultra-low interest rate era is affecting Corporate America.

The article argues that the era of cheap money is over and that many companies now face materially higher borrowing costs when refinancing debt. So far, the greatest pressure has been concentrated among lower-rated borrowers, particularly companies with weaker balance sheets and higher leverage. These firms are increasingly being forced to refinance debt at rates significantly above what they paid when money was abundant and inexpensive.

The article also notes that refinancing risk could spread more broadly under economic stress. If losses among lower-quality borrowers force investors to raise cash, selling pressure could potentially spill over into higher-quality credit markets. Nevertheless, the authors generally maintain that default risk across the broader economy should remain manageable, provided economic conditions do not deteriorate significantly.

How Cheap Money Changed Investment Decisions

In my view, the most important aspect of the article is not its discussion of refinancing risk, but rather what it reveals about the consequences of the post-2008 era of ultra-low interest rates.

As the article acknowledges, years of exceptionally low borrowing costs helped finance stock buybacks, private equity acquisitions, and investments that may not have occurred under historically normal interest rate conditions. For perspective, the average Effective Federal Funds Rate over the past seven decades has been approximately 4.6%, far above the near-zero rates that prevailed for much of the period following the Global Financial Crisis. I wrote about borrowing phenomena in a previous post where I discussed the marginal productivity of debt.

Many economists refer to investments that only appear attractive under artificially low financing costs as "malinvestment." In other words, capital is allocated toward projects that may not be economically justified under normal market conditions. While such investments can create the appearance of growth during the expansion phase, their long-term profitability is often uncertain because they are driven more by cheap credit than by sustainable consumer demand.

This is why some economists view prolonged periods of ultra-low interest rates as laying the groundwork for future economic weakness. When financing costs eventually return to more normal levels, projects that depended on cheap debt may struggle to generate adequate returns. As a result, defaults can rise, capital may need to be reallocated, and economic growth can slow as markets adjust to a more sustainable footing.

Mispriced Risk

The FT article recognizes many of these risks, but ultimately concludes that the situation remains manageable unless economic conditions weaken materially. I am less certain. The longer credit is mispriced, the greater the possibility that underlying vulnerabilities remain hidden. While the economy has thus far been supported by massive AI-related investment spending, the ultimate profitability of many of these investments remains unclear. If those expected returns fail to materialize, the adjustment process could prove more painful than many currently anticipate.

Conclusion

The FT article correctly identifies the distortions created by the era of cheap money. Where I differ is that I believe the risks associated with those distortions may be larger and more meaningful than the authors suggest, increasing the probability of a more significant and material economic correction in the years ahead.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

How Regulations Meant to Make Banks Safer Fueled the Rise of Private Credit

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, regulators implemented a suite of new rules aimed at making the banking system safer. A recent research paper from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) sheds light on an important, and perhaps unintended, consequence of these reforms: the explosive growth of the private credit market.

The study reveals that post-crisis liquidity regulations, specifically the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), have been a major driver of the shift in lending away from traditional banks and into the hands of non-bank lenders, such as private credit funds. Here are the key takeaways I noted after reading the research paper.

The Scale of the Shift: Private Credit Growth

The chart below illustrates the dramatic growth of loan assets held by non-bank financial institutions, a key proxy for the private credit market. The steep and sustained rise, particularly in the years following the adoption of the LCR (2014), visually captures the trend analyzed in the BIS research paper.

The Great Lending Shift

The core finding of the paper is clear: in areas with a heavy presence of large banks subject to the LCR, private credit volumes grew significantly more than in other areas.

When the LCR was introduced, it required banks to hold more high-quality liquid assets (HQLA). To meet these requirements, banks scaled back on holding illiquid loans for small and mid-size firms. This created a vacuum in the market, which private credit funds swiftly stepped in to fill.

The study used the leveraged loan market as a control group to prove this point. Leveraged loans are typically originated by banks but then quickly sold off to other investors, so they don’t weigh on a bank’s balance sheet in the same way. The research found that this market was unaffected by the LCR. This contrast reinforced the conclusion that the growth in private credit was a direct result of regulatory constraints on banks’ own balance sheets, not a general increase in loan demand.

A Safer System, Or Just a Different One?

A central question raised by this shift is whether it has truly made the financial system safer. The paper suggests that from one perspective, the answer is yes. However, it also supports a more nuanced view: risk rarely disappears; it simply moves and changes form.

On one hand, the shift has likely reduced a specific type of vulnerability. Private credit funds are typically funded by long-term capital from investors, which is locked in for years. This is a much more stable funding source for long-term, illiquid loans compared to a bank’s short-term deposits. This better matching of assets and liabilities reduces the “maturity mismatch” risk that makes traditional banks vulnerable to runs.

On the other hand, this doesn’t mean risk has vanished from the economy. As many have argued, the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated that transferring risk away from banks does not necessarily eliminate it. Prior to the crisis, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan argued that derivatives helped transfer risk to those most capable of bearing it, but he later acknowledged that the crisis exposed a "flaw" in his understanding of how the financial system would manage those risks. The crucial question then becomes whether the non-bank entities taking on this risk are truly equipped to manage it.

Important Considerations for the New Landscape

While the findings are positive in some respects, the paper adds a few crucial caveats that align with this cautious view of risk.

First, this shift does not eliminate systemic risk entirely. The analysis doesn’t fully account for factors like deposit insurance or central bank backstops. More importantly, it highlights the potential for new, unforeseen risks to emerge. For instance, risks can return to the banking system through the back door via the credit lines that banks provide to private credit funds. If these funds face distress, they could draw down on these lines, transmitting stress right back into the regulated banking sector.

This creates a new channel for financial contagion, reminiscent of how derivatives were once thought to distribute risk before 2008 but instead amplified risk throughout the system.

Conclusion

The BIS paper provides compelling evidence that regulations designed to make banks safer have the profound side effect of fueling the private credit boom. This has fundamentally reshaped the world of lending. While the shift may have created a more resilient financial ecosystem by addressing specific liquidity risks, it also underscores a timeless lesson in finance: risk is rarely destroyed, only redistributed. The stability of the system now depends on a new set of factors and a new web of interconnectedness that we are only just beginning to fully understand. 

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Inflation Remains Elevated as Markets Price in a December Rate Hike

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased 0.4% in October after rising 0.6% in September. On a year-over-year basis, inflation now stands at approximately 3.7%, remaining well above the Federal Reserve's long-run target of 2%.

While inflation has moderated significantly from its peak, recent data suggest that price pressures remain more persistent than policymakers would prefer. For the Federal Reserve, the latest CPI report provides little evidence that inflation has returned to a level consistent with its target.

Financial markets have responded accordingly. Current market pricing (as of Nov 10, 2026) indicates roughly a 91% probability that the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates by 25 basis points at its December 9, 2026 meeting.

Given both the inflation data and market expectations, a quarter-point rate increase currently appears to be the most likely outcome. Although the probability remains relatively low, markets are still assigning a small chance that the Federal Reserve could choose a larger 50-basis-point increase if inflationary pressures prove more persistent than expected.

Conclusion

Today's CPI report reinforces the view that the Federal Reserve's fight against inflation is not yet complete. Barring a significant deterioration in economic conditions or an unexpected decline in inflation before the December meeting, the Federal Reserve appears likely to further tighten monetary policy.

Monday, November 9, 2026

The CPI-PPI Gap: More Evidence of a Profit Margin Squeeze

Several weeks ago, I wrote an article titled "Upstream Pressure, Downstream Reality: What the CPI vs. PPI Gap Means for Corporate Profits and the Economy." In that piece, I argued that the growing gap between producer inflation (PPI) and consumer inflation (CPI) suggested that businesses were absorbing a significant portion of rising costs rather than fully passing them on to consumers.

Over the weekend, ZeroHedge published an article by Lance Roberts titled "PPI Vs CPI: Are Record Profit Margins About To Get Squeezed?" that reached a remarkably similar conclusion.

The central thesis of both analyses is straightforward: when producer prices rise faster than consumer prices, businesses face pressure because their input costs increase faster than their selling prices. In other words, someone has to absorb the difference. When consumers are unable or unwilling to pay higher prices, corporate profit margins become the shock absorber.

As Roberts summarizes, “the PPI vs CPI gap says companies are absorbing costs their customers can't afford, and record margins leave very little room to absorb much more."

That is essentially the same conclusion I reached in my earlier article.

What I found particularly valuable in the ZeroHedge analysis was the historical context. Roberts examined prior episodes where producer inflation outpaced consumer inflation by a wide margin and found that “six times since 1950, producer inflation outpaced consumer inflation by 4 points or more. In four of them, the profit share of GDP fell 1 to 4.4 points within two years. The two exceptions had consumers with rising incomes. Today, real hourly earnings are down 0.7%.”

The historical evidence supports a point that I believe is especially important. The PPI-CPI gap alone does not automatically guarantee falling profit margins. The critical question is whether consumers have the financial capacity to absorb higher prices. If incomes are rising sufficiently, businesses can often pass costs through successfully. If incomes are stagnant or falling in real terms, passing through higher prices becomes much more difficult.

This is what makes the current environment noteworthy. We have rising upstream cost pressures, record corporate profitability, and evidence that real wage growth remains weak. If these conditions persist, history suggests that profit margins could come under increasing pressure over the next couple of years.

Conclusion 

I continue to agree with what I view as the article’s most important observation: “Costs can climb for a long time before margins crack. The crack comes when the customer stops paying.”

Time will tell whether businesses ultimately succeed in passing these higher costs on to consumers or whether profit margins absorb a larger share of the adjustment. For now, the PPI-CPI gap remains one of the indicators I am watching closely.

Saturday, November 7, 2026

After the Selloff: Has the Market Become Too Dependent on AI?

After the midweek market rout, the Financial Times reported:

"US stocks shed $3.2tn in a day of chaotic trading which saw the tech-heavy Nasdaq 100 plunge 6.4 per cent after Democrats' sweeping midterm election victory upended Wall Street's mammoth AI bet... The market value drop on the S&P Composite 1500 index, a broad basket of America's publicly traded companies, was the biggest since the turn of the millennium... Selling among chipmakers was brutal, with Nvidia, the company most closely associated with the AI surge, tumbling 9.3 per cent, pushing its market value down more than $400bn."

Reading this reminded me of a post-2026 Midterm Election conference I attended, where several market leaders shared their views on the sharp decline in equity markets. One speaker argued that a significant portion of the S&P 500's recent performance has become tied, directly or indirectly, to AI-related investment, particularly in the semiconductor industry.

That observation struck a chord with me. The AI sector has become deeply interconnected with broader corporate spending, investment plans, and market expectations. As a result, I expect that weakness in AI-related industries will not remain confined to a handful of technology companies. In my view, a sustained slowdown would likely spill over into broader market sentiment and potentially affect other sectors as well.

Looking ahead, I suspect policymakers will face increasing pressure to address public concerns surrounding AI, including issues related to privacy, employment, and safety. One possible response would be the development of regulatory frameworks intended to provide greater oversight and clearer rules for businesses operating in the space.

The challenge is that meaningful regulatory efforts often take time. Policymaking, implementation, and compliance do not happen overnight. Markets, however, can move much faster than the political process. If investor enthusiasm for AI weakens significantly before greater regulatory clarity emerges, the adjustment could be painful.

That does not mean an AI-driven downturn is inevitable. However, as AI has become one of the market's primary growth engines, investors will continue to pay close attention to the risks associated with that dependence. The question is not whether AI will remain an important technology. The question is whether current expectations for AI-related growth are sustainable.

Thursday, November 5, 2026

The 2026 Midterms: Why Economic Reality Still Matters

As of November 5, 2026 (~5pm), the midterm election results have yielded a net forty-seat increase in the US House of Representatives for the Democratic Party, which puts their total at 252 and 155 for Republicans. There are still 28 seats remaining to be decided. In all likelihood the Democratic Party will end up with a seat count somewhere in the mid-260s after all votes are counted. A similar pattern emerges out of the US Senate: Democrats have secured 54 seats, a gain of seven seats, compared with 44 seats for Republicans. There are 2 seats remaining to be decided. That means that the Democrats will control what happens in Congress. Their legislative agenda should pass with relative ease through Congress, as all they need is a simple majority to pass bills. But when it comes to overriding a presidential veto, they need a two-thirds majority in both chambers (290 votes in the House and 67 votes in the Senate). Therefore, the hurdle increases significantly to achieve the override.

Against this background, it was not surprising that US stock markets went up a lot on the day after the election (e.g., on November 4, the Dow ended the day at 53,356, up 1,520 from the previous day (November 3); and the S&P ended the day at 7,688, up 120 from the previous day). I believe that was the result of expected gridlock (i.e., nothing of meaningful economic consequence will occur) in Washington DC over the remaining presidency of Donald Trump. I also think markets expected that the Iran conflict would materially subside, leading to a continued decline in fuel prices, and thus taming inflationary pressures and future interest rate increases by the Fed. Or so goes the hypothesis, because today (November 5) the Dow, the S&P500, and the NASDAQ closed deep in the red at about 3.45%, 4.47%, and 5.52% respectively.

The equity market’s behavior could be one of those where you “buy the rumor” and “sell on the news”. Perhaps. But I don’t think so. Granted, it has only been a couple of days since the midterm elections occurred, but I view this as a harbinger of a broader recognition that there are deep structural economic imbalances that no Democratic or Republican agenda can fix in one election cycle. Simply examine the US federal debt and you will see that the upward trend has happened across multiple administrations under different parties.

The Austrian view of the economic cycle, which I lean toward, says that artificially low interest rates lead to a misallocation of capital across the economy. That misallocation is what ultimately creates the boom and bust economic cycle. The artificially low interest rates over most of the 2010s, coupled with the massive increase in liquidity after the COVID pandemic, have led to a massive misallocation of capital. In other words, projects that should not have taken place occurred simply because the cost of capital was relatively low.

Conclusion:

In my view, the Democratic Party's control of the US Congress should not automatically be interpreted as a mandate to promote its political agenda. The midterm election results reflect widespread voter dissatisfaction with the Trump administration. I am deeply skeptical that the Democratic Party will do anything meaningful to try to meet the expectations of the voters. I expect they will pursue partisan agendas that will not help steer the economy to where it should be. The truth is that all grand plans must meet economic reality. That is why I like to analyze what is happening in the economy. There are significant economic concerns, whether they are the size of the federal debt, massive increases in AI capital expenditures (capex), or decades-low consumer confidence, all of these point to profound structural issues whose gravity I doubt politicians fully grasp, or about which they have limited ability to do much. But I could be wrong. I hope I am.