Economic Risk Dashboard: What the Numbers Suggest as-of October 2, 2026

Here I am showing what the Economic Risk Dashboard suggests based on data as of October 2, 2026. The data is sourced from the St. Louis Fed FRED database and I used my proprietary Python program to extract and analyze the data, as show below. For the conceptual foundation of the dashboard, read my previous post where I explain the framework in more detail.

The dashboard presents a mixed but generally stable picture of the US economy. At present, the dashboard suggests an economy that is not exhibiting broad-based stress, but one in which consumer sentiment remains exceptionally weak.

Household health remains solid, with unemployment at 4.2% and no evidence of deterioration in either the six-month or twelve-month trend.

Credit markets also continue to function normally, as high-yield spreads, investment-grade spreads, commercial paper spreads, and bank lending standards remain well below stress thresholds.

The one area that warrants closer attention is consumer confidence. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index remains near multi-decade lows, even as other indicators remain stable.

What Rising Treasury Yields and Falling Gold Prices Tell Us About the Federal Reserve

A few readers may notice an apparent tension between two recent articles I published.

In my September 14 article, I noted that oil price spikes associated with the Iran conflict appeared to be contributing to higher inflation expectations. Because nominal Treasury yields incorporate expected inflation, it is reasonable that Treasury rates would rise as investors reassess the inflation outlook.

However, a rise in inflation expectations does not automatically imply that inflation fears have become widespread or persistent. That was the focus of my September 30 article. The inflation measures and expectation metrics reviewed there, including Median CPI, 3-Year Expected Inflation, and the 5-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate, continue to suggest that inflation expectations remain relatively well anchored by historical standards.

At first glance, these two observations might look like a paradox: If inflation expectations are rising enough to push bond yields up, why wouldn’t gold rally on the same inflation fears?

The short answer is that inflation expectations and inflation fears are related concepts, but they are not the same thing. But the more detailed and nuanced answer lies in foundational economic concepts developed in the 1970s: central bank credibility and the difference between expected and unexpected policy.

Economists Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace wrote a paper in 1975 called “’Rational’ Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule.” Sargent and Wallace argued that when market participants understand and anticipate a Central Bank’s reaction plan (they called this “systemic policy”), they adjust prices, contracts, and interest rates smoothly. In contrast, severe market dislocations and panics occur only when the Central Bank loses control and delivers unexpected surprises or allows inflation expectations to become unanchored.

In another paper called “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans” published in 1977 by economists Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, they argued that Central Bank credibility does not simply mean investors believe what policymakers say today. It means investors believe policymakers have the institutional discipline and incentive structure to stick to their commitments over time, specifically, keeping inflation under control rather than trying to engineer short-term economic booms.

In short, when markets trust a Central Bank’s long-term resolve, an increase in inflation is treated as a routine economic cycle rather than a structural crisis.

A picture is worth a thousand words. Look at the graphic below, as it will crystalize the two market dynamics that I highlighted in my two previous blog posts.

Why Treasury Yields Rose (The Bond Market Perspective) 

Treasury bonds pay fixed dollar payouts. If investors expect everyday prices to rise slightly over the coming years, they naturally demand higher interest rates on their bonds to offset the eroding purchasing power of future cash flows. Because investors viewed this rise in inflation as an expected, standard cyclical move, the bond market did what it was designed to do: smoothly adjust nominal yields higher to compensate for anticipated inflation and the FRB's monetary policy that follows.

Why Gold Fell (The Precious Metals Perspective)

Gold does not pay interest or dividends. Investors will rush into gold when they perceive heightened political risk and inflation risk. On the inflation risk side, two critical conditions that drive the price of gold are:

1. When investors fear a loss of FRB's credibility (currency debasement or runaway inflation).

2. When inflation-adjusted (real) interest rates fall to zero or negative, making holding cash less appealing than holding physical metal.

The available evidence suggests that neither condition was broadly present. Median inflation metrics showed that long-term inflation fears remained firmly bounded, and monetary growth was moderating. More importantly, because markets trusted the FRB to keep policy tight enough to fight inflation, real (inflation-adjusted) yields on government bonds remained attractive. With safe government bonds offering relatively solid real returns, the opportunity cost of holding zero-yield gold went up, putting downward pressure on gold prices.

Summary: Two Sides of the Same Credible Coin

Market Signal	What Happened	What It Tells Us About the FRB
Long-Term Treasury Yields	Rose	Markets are pricing-in anticipated cyclical growth and inflation.
Gold Prices	Softened	Markets trust that inflation will remain anchored, keeping real returns on bonds positive.
Monetary Base	Slower Growth	The FRB is maintaining balance-sheet discipline.

In summary, rather than conflicting, these two market behaviors are complementary pieces of evidence that investors continue to view the FRB as credible because:

·        The rise in bond yields showed that the market was pricing-in anticipated economic realities.

·    The weakness in gold prices suggests that investors generally continued to view the FRB as committed to maintaining price stability.

Conclusion:

When financial indicators seem to send mixed messages, it often pays to look beneath the surface. Inflation expectations can remain well anchored and not support the characterization that inflation fears have "roared back." The distinction is important. Markets may be pricing a somewhat higher inflation outlook than they were a few months ago, but that is very different from pricing an inflationary crisis.

Both trends point to one overarching reality today: the FRB’s policy credibility remains firmly intact.

Now, that reality can change. All we have to do is go back to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 – 2010 to observe how reality changed quickly and suddenly.

The Possibility of a Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Risk Few Talk About

ZeroHedge published an article today on something that has been on my mind: the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis causing a contagion that would lead to massive financial losses. When I think of financial contagion, I often think of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund crisis of 1998 that was precipitated by Russia’s currency devaluation. The LTCM losses were quite severe at the time and would have had a material impact on other financial institutions had the Federal Reserve not intervened.

History repeats itself, but only in rhythms. So goes the saying. I can envision a scenario where debt levels in Western nations hit an inflection point where investors attempt to sell their marketable debt while simultaneously demanding higher yields to compensate for default risk. This scenario is not far-fetched. It has happened in history, and there is no reason why it could not happen again. Of course, the circumstances surrounding such a scenario would likely be different this time, but the outcome would be the same: massive losses across financial markets because of their increased interconnectedness.

Look at these charts provided by ZeroHedge:

Italy vs. Germany Yield Spreads

 

France vs. Germany Yield Spreads

Conclusion:

Given the large debt burdens carried by many Western nations, some form of sovereign debt distress is a legitimate possibility. That distress does not necessarily have to take the form of an outright default. Governments may choose to monetize debt, restructure obligations, suppress yields, or pursue other measures that reduce the real burden of repayment. Regardless of the mechanism, investors may face losses if debt obligations are not honored according to their original terms.

A significant portion of sovereign debt is currently treated as low-risk collateral throughout the financial system. In a crisis, however, declining bond values could trigger collateral calls and liquidity pressures across highly leveraged institutions. Because modern financial markets are deeply interconnected, it is difficult to predict where stress will ultimately emerge.

The point is not to forecast every detail of a potential crisis. Rather, it is to recognize that the possibility exists and to take reasonable precautions before risks become obvious to everyone.

Have Inflation Fears Really Returned? Gold and the Message of Inflation Expectations

MarketWatch published an article on gold that was later reprinted in Morningstar news, where I came across it. Among other things, the article stated the following:

“The yellow metal has gotten hammered this month as oil prices have spiked and inflation fears have roared back, while technology stocks and even bitcoin - the very bets investors are supposed to flee in a panic - have ripped higher and helped underpin the broader stock market.”

I would like to address the "inflation fears" comment because the data from the past year do not fully support that characterization. Let me show you four charts obtained from the St. Louis FED Fred tool.

1. Monetary Base, which accounts for currency in circulation plus reserve balances. This is a proxy of how much liquidity the FRB has pumped into the financial system. Note: Red arrows are my notation.

Let's examine the increase in the monetary base between November 2025 and May 2026. During that period, the monetary base increased approximately 4.5% (=(160.9/154) - 1)*100), but then it declined to about 2.3% from May 2026 to August 2026. 

2. Median Consumer Price Index, which “according to research from the Cleveland Fed, the Median CPI provides a better signal of the inflation trend than either the all-items CPI or the CPI excluding food and energy. According to newer research done at the Cleveland Fed, the Median CPI is even better at PCE inflation in the near and longer term than the core PCE.” Note: Red arrows are my notation.

3. 3-Year Expected Inflation, which is a Cleveland Fed measure of expected inflation derived from Treasury yields, inflation swaps, inflation data, and survey-based measures of inflation expectations.

4. 5-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate, which “represents a measure of expected inflation derived from 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Securities (DGS5) and 5-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Constant Maturity Securities. The latest value implies what market participants expect inflation to be in the next 5 years, on average.”

Charts 2 through 4 suggest that inflation expectations remain relatively well anchored alongside current inflation measures. If inflation fears were becoming widespread and persistent, we would likely expect to see a more significant increase in both realized inflation measures and inflation expectations.

Conclusion:

Gold is a political hedge and an inflation hedge. Currently, there is little evidence of broad-based accelerating inflation, nor do inflation expectations suggest such an outcome in the near term. In the political sphere, the behavior of gold prices suggests that investors may not currently be pricing a major and lasting economic disruption from the conflict.

Opportunity Cost of Illiquidity: Why Flexibility Has Value

At a conference today, I heard a term that immediately caught my attention. I must confess that I had never heard the phrase before, but it definitely resonated with me and left me thinking more deeply about its meaning and significance.

Let us define some terms first.

What is ‘opportunity cost’? It is the value of the next best alternative that we forgo when choosing one option over another. For example, the opportunity cost of investing capital in equities may be the interest income that could have been earned from a government security.

What is ‘illiquidity’? To answer that fully, we must look first at the definition of liquidity. Liquidity is the ability to turn some asset into cash quickly and without a high cost. Therefore, illiquidity means either the inability to convert an asset into cash quickly or the need to incur a significant cost in order to do so.

Putting this all together, the opportunity cost of illiquidity is the value of the opportunities that become unavailable because capital is locked in an asset that cannot be easily converted into cash.

The individual who mentioned the phrase said that investors either underestimate the ‘opportunity cost of illiquidity’ or ignore it altogether. Although the speaker did not elaborate further, I took his phrase to mean that, as investors, we must consider not only the investment we are about to make but also the alternative opportunities that may become unavailable once our capital is committed. In other words, many investors focus on the question, “What return will I earn from this investment?” but the real question should be, “What flexibility am I giving up by making this investment?”

When we talk about flexibility, we are in fact talking about optionality, which means the ability to react to crises, exploit opportunities, rebalance, or meet unforeseen obligations. Liquidity has value because it preserves future choices, and the opportunity cost of illiquidity is the loss of that optionality. An illiquid investment may earn 12%, but if that investment prevents you from deploying capital into an extraordinary 30% opportunity later, the true economic cost may be much greater than initially expected.

Conclusion:

Liquidity is more than a source of funding. It is a reserve of future possibilities. The opportunity cost of illiquidity, therefore, is not merely the inability to access cash, but the loss of opportunities that may arise while our capital remains locked away. This may help explain why experienced investors often maintain cash reserves even when attractive investments are available. The value of liquidity is not always apparent today, but it becomes obvious when unexpected opportunities emerge. Illiquidity does not need to have a negative connotation, but an adept investor may willingly surrender liquidity if he is being adequately compensated.

This concept applies not only to investing, but also to life in general. For example, taking a highly specialized job may create opportunity costs by reducing future career flexibility; or purchasing a home versus renting can involve an opportunity cost of reduced mobility. In that sense, liquidity and optionality are not merely financial concepts. They are frameworks for decision-making under uncertainty.

How Interest Rate Changes Affect Bank Profitability and Capital

Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book (IRRBB) refers to the potential impact that changes in market interest rates can have on a bank's earnings and its overall capital. This risk arises from the core business of banking: taking in deposits and lending money out, often over different timeframes and at different types of rates (fixed vs floating).

We can break down the main effects into three key areas:

1. The Funding Side: The Cost of Deposits

A bank's primary source of funding is customer deposits. The risk here is that the cost of these deposits can change unexpectedly. When market interest rates rise, banks may need to increase the interest they pay to depositors to prevent customers from moving their money to higher-yielding investments. If the bank has to raise its deposit rate quickly, its cost of funding goes up, which squeezes the profit margin it earns from lending. Conversely, when rates fall, if the bank cannot lower its deposit rates proportionally (perhaps because they are already near zero), its profit margin is also compressed.

2. The Asset Side: The value of Loans and Mortgages

This is the risk associated with the money the bank has already lent out, especially long-term, fixed-rate loans like mortgages. Consider this example: If a bank has issued a 30-year mortgage at a fixed rate of 3%, and market rates then rise to 5%, the bank is stuck earning a below-market rate for years. The economic value of that 3% loan decreases because it's less profitable than a new loan issued today. We refer to this economic relationship as 'duration' risk.

If market rates fall significantly, homeowners with those 3% mortgages will likely refinance to get a new, lower rate. They pay back their loans to the bank early. The bank now has its cash back, but must lend it out again at the new, lower market rate, earning less income than it had originally planned. This is known as Prepayment Risk.

3. The Impact on Capital: The Investment Portfolio

This is a direct and significant impact on the bank’s balance sheet and net worth, separate from its day-to-day earnings. Banks hold large portfolios of high quality securities (like government treasuries) as a way to store liquidity. When interest rates rise, the market value of existing, lower-yielding bonds falls. There is a negative relationship between market interest rates and the price of fixed-income securities. This “paper loss” doesn’t immediately hit the bank’s income statement. Instead, it is recorded in a special section of shareholder’s equity called Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI). A negative entry in AOCI directly reduces the bank’s total equity, thereby lowering its book value and shrinking its capital base.  

Putting the Pieces Together

Let me give you a brief example. Take a look at the interest income and interest expense behavior based on data available in the St. Louis FED FRED Tool.

It is clear that around 2Q2022 to about 3Q2024 interest expense increased faster than interest income, leading to a compression in bank’s net interest income. This particular time was when we had higher market interest rates. 

Conclusion:

Interest rate risk can materially affect a bank's earnings, liquidity profile, and capital position. Depending on the structure of its assets and liabilities, rising interest rates may initially benefit or hurt net interest income. However, as funding costs adjust and securities portfolios experience valuation pressure, many banks face net interest income margin compression and reductions in economic capital. While banks actively hedge these exposures, hedging involves costs and may not fully offset the effects of large interest rate movements.

The Art of Plausible Deniability in Market Commentary

I recently read an opinion piece in the Financial Times arguing that 5% is the "magic number" for the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield and that yields are unlikely to move sustainably higher. The writer is Karen Ward, who is the chief market strategist for Europe, Middle East and Africa at JPMorgan Asset Management.

Karen framed the discussion around three arguments for higher yields:

1. AI-driven productivity gains have raised the neutral rate of interest.

2. Investors should demand a larger premium because of deteriorating U.S. fiscal policy.

3. Bonds have lost their diversification benefits.

What struck me was that the author treated these three arguments very differently.

For the first argument, she discussed why AI productivity gains would need to be exceptionally large to justify materially higher yields and pointed to signs that higher rates are already affecting the economy. However, she never clearly stated, "I am skeptical of this view." The reader is left to infer her position.

The second argument was similar. She acknowledged that U.S. fiscal policy likely deserves some additional risk premium, but then emphasized the Federal Reserve's credibility in controlling inflation. Again, she never directly stated whether she believed fiscal concerns were large enough to drive yields materially higher. Here again, we are left to wonder what her stance is.

The third argument was different. There, the author explicitly stated, "This is wrong." She rejected the idea that bonds have permanently lost their diversification value, arguing that if the AI boom weakens and growth slows, Treasuries could still provide significant portfolio protection through falling yields and Fed rate cuts. To me, there is nothing particularly revelatory about her observation because that is largely what has transpired in recent years, although I would argue that this view rests on shakier foundations than many investors assume.  

Let’s go back to her points. Note the asymmetry in treatment for each one. Given that the author is a chief strategist at a large asset manager, this may not be accidental. Institutional market commentary often leaves room for multiple outcomes. Strongly rejecting an argument can be costly if events later prove otherwise.

The important takeaway of Karen's view is that it's broadly representative of the prevailing Wall Street narrative that yields are approaching a ceiling and are unlikely to move sustainably higher. However, it largely dismisses the fact that Treasury yields have been on a sustained upward trajectory since 2020. In April 2020, the 10-year Treasury yield was roughly 0.61%, and by September 24, 2026, it had risen to 5.18%. I do not yet see evidence that the forces driving higher yields have gone away.

Conclusion:

Beware when reading market views of institutional players because incentives may be misaligned. That does not mean that the analysis is wrong, but incentives are a big deal to determine credibility. When a strategist at a major institution publishes an opinion piece, from their perspective there is often value (incentives) in leaving room for multiple outcomes.

As an independent observer, my incentives are gaining wisdom, knowledge, and understanding and conveying what I see to the broader public. Unlike institutional strategists, I am not tasked with representing a large asset-management business.

There is nothing magical about 5%, or 4.99%, or 6%. People (or the markets) give meaning to those numbers. What matters is the trend. As I've pointed out previously, the upward trend in yields remains firmly entrenched. Given the amount of liquidity and fiscal spending in the system, I believe it will become increasingly difficult for the FOMC to prevent bond vigilantes from demanding higher yields.